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The emergence and sustenance of cooperative behavior is fundamental for a society to thrive. Recent 
experimental studies have shown that cooperation increases in dynamic networks in which subjects 
can choose their partners. However, these studies did not vary reputational knowledge, or what 
subjects know about other’s past actions, which has long been recognized as an important factor in 
supporting cooperation. They also did not give sub-jects access to global social knowledge, or 
information on who is connected to whom in the group. As a result, it remained un-known how 
reputational and social knowledge foster cooperative behavior in dynamic networks both 
independently and by complementing each other. In an experimental setting, we show that global 
reputational knowledge is crucial to sustaining a high level of cooperation and welfare. Cooperation 
is associated with the emergence of dense and clustered networks with highly cooperative hubs. 
Global social knowledge has no effect on the aggregate level of cooperation. A community analysis 
shows that the addition of global social knowledge to global reputational knowledge affects the 
distribution of cooperative activity: cooperators forma separate community that achieves a higher 
cooperation level than the community of defectors. Members of the community of cooperators 
achieve a higher payoff from interactions within the community than members of the less cooperative 
community. 
 
Cooperation among a group of individuals can create a surplus that benefits everyone, but it is often 
undermined by self-interested incentives to free ride on others’ contributions (1).What drives the 
emergence of cooperative behavior and how it is possible to sustain it over time are fundamental 
questions that have been of long-standing interest to social scientists (2). The most common abstract 
representation of the trade-off individuals face between cooperating and free-riding is the prisoner’s 
dilemma game, which has been widely studied both theoretically and experimentally (3, 4).Recent 
simulation-based (5, 6) and experimental (7–10)studies investigating individuals playing the prisoner’s 
dilemma game in a group have shown that the ability to form and break connections, and thereby 
select with whom to play the game, has a significant effect on the level of cooperation. The possibility 
of forming new connections with cooperative individuals encourages defectors to switch to 
cooperative behavior even if many of their neighbors are defecting (11). The process of network 
formation relies on two dimensions of information available to individuals, which we dub reputational 
and social knowledge. Reputational knowledge is what individuals know about the previous actions of 
others in the group. Social knowledge is what individuals know about the structure of the social 
network within the group, which determines who plays the game with whom. In the context of 
repeated interactions between two players, reputational knowledge has long been recognized as an 
important factor in determining cooperation both in theoretical (2, 12, 13)and experimental (2, 14–
17) settings. In the two-player case, it is indifferent whether information about the other player’s 
previous actions comes from a player’s past interaction or from an external reputational mechanism 
because the two channels coincide. However, this is not the case in a group of individuals in whom 
the social network determines interactions. If the information about others’ previous actions comes 
from the social network and in-direct communication is infeasible, reputational knowledge will only 
be available about an individual’s connections, whereas if a reputational mechanism external to the 
network is present, then an individual will have reputational knowledge about everyone independent 
of the network. Previous experimental studies have focused on the specific cases in which reputational 
knowledge is available for either every other individual (7, 9, 10) or only the neighbors (8), and 
therefore they cannot disentangle whether an external reputational mechanism is necessary for 
cooperation or whether reputational knowledge available through the social net-work itself may 
suffice. Social knowledge matters in the link formation process be-cause it aids individuals in 
identifying opportunities in the net-work (18, 19). For instance, in the context of cooperation, it may 
help identify loci of cooperative activity in the group, which in turn may have an effect on the 
aggregate level of cooperation. Surprisingly, the role that differences in the level of social knowledge 
have in the network formation process, and the influence they have on individual behavior in games 
on networks, have received little attention in both the theoretical (20) and the experimental (21) 
literatures. Previous experimental studies about cooperation on networks provide subjects only with 
in-formation on the identity of their neighbors, and therefore do not investigate the role of social 
knowledge in determining the network structure and the level of cooperation. 
 
 
Significance 
 
Cooperation is essential for societies to prosper. Recent experiments show that cooperation emerges 
in dynamic net-works in which subjects can select their connections. However, these studies fixed the 
amount of reputation information available and did not display the network to subjects. Here, we 
systematically vary the knowledge available to subjects about reputation and the network to 
investigate experimentally their roles in determining cooperation in dynamic networks. Com-mon 
knowledge about everyone’s reputation is the main driver of cooperation leading to dense and 
clustered networks. The addition of common knowledge about the network affects the distribution of 
cooperative activity: cooperators forma separate community and achieve a higher payoff from within-
community interactions than members of the less cooperative community. 
 
Reputational and social knowledge are not just independent channels but also interact to determine 
the social network that emerges, and consequently the level of cooperation. Individuals use 
information about previous actions to decide to whom to connect (9), and therefore the extent of 
reputational knowledge available may matter in determining the density of the network. As already 
mentioned, individuals use information about the network to decide to whom to link; for example, 
they may decide to link to the connections of their neighbors, thereby increasing the level of clustering 
of the network. The presence of both reputational and social knowledge may combine to further 
enhance these effects. Previous studies do not vary the level of reputational and/or social knowledge 
available to subjects, and therefore, in addition to not being able to identify their in-dependent 
influence, they cannot explore the combined effects of reputational and social knowledge in 
determining the network structure and, ultimately, the level of cooperation. Using web-based 
experiments, we aim to identify the role of reputational and social knowledge in the emergence of co-
operation and the structural features of the network associated with cooperative activity. The general 
set-up is a group of sub-jects playing several rounds of a prisoner’s dilemma game on a network, with 
each round consisting of a network formation stage followed by the game played on the resulting 
network. The treatment variables are reputational and social knowledge. In our baseline treatment, 
subjects only know who their neighbors are and what the neighbors’ previous actions were. Two 
further treatments build on the baseline by adding reputational and social knowledge about everyone 
respectively, allowing a separate investigation of the two channels. A final treatment has reputational 
and social knowledge about everyone, allowing an exploration of their combined effect on 
cooperation and the network structure. 
  
 
Experimental Setup 
 
We recruited 364 US-based subjects using the online labor market Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT), 
which provides amore diverse subject pool compared with the typical student samples used in 
laboratory studies (22, 23). Each subject is as-signed to a group of 13 and participates in the 
experiment only once. Unlike some other studies that use subjects from AMT (9,24, 25), we emulate 
the workflow and procedures of lab-based experiments by requiring subjects to read the instructions 
and complete the experiment in a single uninterrupted session, and by preventing multiple 
participation even by subjects who have only seen the instructions (see SI Appendix for details), which 
is analogous to the procedures of two recent contributions (7, 10).An experimental session consists of 
13–16 rounds of a multi-player prisoner’s dilemma game on an endogenous network. The first round 
starts with the empty network with no link between subjects. After round 13, there is a 50% probability 
that the game terminates in each of the following rounds. Each round consists of three stages. The 
first two stages determine the network on which subjects play the game. In stage 1, subjects can 
propose costless links to any of the other subjects and can unilaterally remove any of their existing 
links. There is no limit to the number of links each subject can remove or propose. If two subjects both 
propose a link to each other, or if a subject removes a link, then the link is added or removed, 
respectively. If a subject has proposed a link to another subject who has not done the same, then in 
stage 2 the recipient of the proposal can accept or reject the proposal. At the end of stage 2, the 
network is updated with all of the linking decisions. In stage 3, subjects play a prisoner’s dilemma 
game by choosing a cooperate (C) or defect (D) action that applies to all their neighbors. The game is 
completely symmetric in payoffs: (C,C)gives 3 points to each subject, (D,D) gives−3 points, (C,D) gives5 
points to the defector and−5 points to the cooperator, and both subjects get 0 points if they are not 
linked. The symmetry of the payoff structure leads to intuitive welfare implications: a society of social 
isolates has welfare 0, and changes to welfare are exclusively driven by the (C,C) and (D,D) links. In the 
data, the welfare level is driven by the number of (C,C) links, so our analysis focuses on the level of 
cooperation, which we define as the links where both subjects choose a cooperative action asa 
proportion of the 78 potential links in the network. At the end of a round, subjects receive the 
following in-formation: a reminder of the action they chose, the actions chosen by each neighbor (or 
everyone, depending on the treatment), and the number of points they receive from the game with 
each of the other subjects. The current network is carried over to the next round. At the end of the 
experiment, for each subject, we select 12 pairings between the subject and one of the other subjects 
(two random pairings in each of six randomly selected rounds) and convert the sum of points won in 
those pairings into dollars for payment. The choice of payoffs and the payment method in our 
experimental design provides the correct incentive structure to allow the formation of meaningful and 
realistic network structures, and consequently the isolation of which network features are generated 
by global reputational and global social knowledge, respectively. The symmetry of payoffs in the 
gains/losses domains means that both the absence of a connection and connections between a 
defector and a cooperator lead to no change in social surplus. The only way to produce social surplus 
is a connection between two cooperators, and, conversely, the only way to reduce social surplus by 
an equal amount is a connection between two defectors. This is in contrast to other studies that have 
nonnegative (10) or small negative (8, 9) payoffs, which lead to the emergence of over connected 
networks because the losses from being connected to a defector are nonexistent or negligible. 
Moreover, the random selection of pairs for payment, independent of whether a connection exists or 
not, ensures that there are uniform incentives throughout the experiment informing connections, so 
the payment system does not introduce biases in the emerging network structure. For instance, if we 
had excluded unconnected pairs from the random selection for payment, then subjects would have 
incentives to form just one(or very few) link(s) with a cooperator to ensure a specific pairing is picked. 
This choice is in contrast to previous studies that pay the cumulative number of points subjects have 
earned(8–10), which may lead to satisficing in the latest rounds, and therefore lower incentives to 
change the network. We conduct four treatments to examine the relative importance of reputational 
and social knowledge. In the baseline (B)treatment, subjects only have access to local reputational 
knowledge: a list of their current neighbors with the last five actions chosen by each one of them and 
a list of the non neighbors without any information on their past actions. They also have access to 
local social knowledge only, so they have no in-formation on the structure of the network beyond 
their neighbors. In the reputation (R) treatment, they have access to global reputational knowledge, 
so they see a list of the last five actions for every other subject, but they are still limited to local social 
knowledge. In the network (N) treatment, they have access to global social knowledge, so they see a 
network figure that shows the connections among all of the subjects in the group, but they only have 
access to local reputational knowledge. Finally, in the reputation and network (RN) treatment, they 
have access to global reputational and social knowledge by seeing the whole network and the last five 
actions for all other subjects. The network figure is interactive, allowing subjects to hover over a node 
to highlight its neighbors and to drag nodes around to rearrange the network visualization. 
 
Results 
 
We begin by investigating how the cooperation level, payoffs, and structure of the network vary at 
the aggregate level across treatments. In the statistical analysis, we aggregate the data at the session 
level (n=7 for each treatment) and apply the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test to compare across 
multiple groups to detect treatment effects, followed by the Dunn’s test with Benjamini-Hochberg 
adjustment for multiple comparisons to explore differences between any two treatments. The choice 
of a nonparametric test and the application of a correction for multiple comparisons with a small (n=7) 
sample per treatment after aggregation is very conservative, and therefore any statistically significant 
finding denotes a sizable treatment effect. The aggregate analysis focuses on rounds 6–13, when 
information about the previous five actions is available. In this section, KW-Drefers to the combination 
of these tests, and we report adjusted Pvalues for the Dunn’s test (the Kruskal-Wallis is always 
significant; seeSI Appendix for all of the details and Pvalues, including a separate analysis of the 
interaction effect between the treatment variables).Fig. 1Ashows the evolution of the level of 
cooperation: the availability of global reputational knowledge is the main determinant of the 
emergence and sustenance of a high level of cooperation. Subjects in the RNtreatment achieve an 
average cooperation level that is larger than in theB(KW-D,P=0.036)andN(KW-D,P=0.060) settings. 
Likewise, the cooperation level in the Rtreatment is higher than theB(KW-D,P=0.032)andN(KW-
D,P=0.036) settings. There is no significant difference in cooperation level between 
theRNandRtreatments, and between the NandBones. The evolution of the payoffs subjects receive 
follows closely the evolution of the level of cooperation. Fig. 1Bshows that a consequence of the 
observed differences in cooperation is that subjects in the global reputation RandRN treatments 
achieve average payoffs that are approximately twice as large as those of subjects in 
theBandNsettings(KW-D:RNvs.B,P=0.041;RNvs.N,P=0.032;Rvs.B,P=0.031;Rvs.N,P=0.063). The 
differences in cooperation and payoffs across treatments are mainly driven by the dynamics, rather 
than the initial play in the first round, as there is no significant difference at the 5%level in first-round 
cooperation or payoffs between any of the treatments. However, treatmentsRandRNbegin with 
qualitatively higher cooperation levels, and the effect is significant at the 10% level for Rcompared 
with treatmentsBandN(KW-D,Rvs.B,P=0.084;Rvs.N,P=0.050). As a result, subjects earna marginally 
higher average payoff in the first round inRandRNcompared withBandN, and the effect is significant 
at the 10%level forR(KW-D,Rvs.B,P=0.058;Rvs.N,P=0.088). A potential explanation is that subjects are 
more cooperative in the first round because they are aware that their actions will be common 
knowledge to the group, and this effect is slightly more pronounced in theRtreatment because the 
lack of global net-work information makes the presence of reputational information more salient. This 
is consistent with previous findings that contributions in a public good game are higher if subjects are 
aware that their decisions will affect their reputation in a sub-sequent indirect reciprocity game 
(26).High cooperativeness is associated with the emergence ofspecific structural properties of the 
network. Fig. 1Cshows the evolution of the density of the network, which is the ratio of the 
connections in the realized network to the number of connections in the complete network, where all 
subjects are connected with each other. All treatments start with the same, very high level of density. 
However, after a few rounds there is a clear differentiation between treatmentsRandRNwith global 
reputation, where the network remains dense, and treatmentsBandNwith local reputation, where the 
network becomes sparser(KW-D:RNvs.B,P=0.017;RNvs.N,P=0.028;Rvs.B,P=0.012;Rvs.N,P=0.014). Fig. 
1Dshows the evolution of the clustering level of the network, which captures the extent to which a 
subject’s connections are connected to each other. Similar to the evolution of density, the networks 
that form in the first round display the same high level of clustering, and the presence of global 
reputational knowledge leads to the emergence of highly clustered networks (KW-
D:RNvs.B,P=0.017;RNvs.N,P=0.022;Rvs.B,P=0.030;Rvs.N,P=0.048).We can gain additional insight on 
the relation between co-operation and network structure by conducting an individual-level analysis 
to investigate how the association between the position of an individual in the network and the 
individual’s cooperativeness depends on the availability of reputational and social knowledge. For 
each treatment, we conduct a logit panel estimation with SEs clustered at the session level, where the 
dependent variable is the action taken by subjects. We focus on several covariates that capture an 
individual’s position in the network structure, and we include a large number of controls (seeSI 
Appendix for details).In the baseline treatmentB, no network metric is a significant correlate of 
cooperativeness, suggesting that the formation of a social structure associated with cooperativeness 
is not possible when subjects only know the identity and the previous actions of their neighbors. 
However, network metrics become significant once we add global reputational and global social 
knowledge independently in theRandNtreatments, respectively, and these differ depending on the 
treatment, which suggests that each type of knowledge plays a different role in the network  formation 
process.The availability of global reputational knowledge is necessary for the emergence of 
cooperative hubs: in theRandRNtreat-ments, the number of connections (Degree) of an individual is a 
highly significant (R: coefficient=13.38;RN: coefficient=36.80;P<0.001 for both) positive correlate of 
cooperative be-havior, whereas the correlation is insignificant in theBandNtreatments, in which only 
local reputation about the neighbors is available. In other words, cooperators thrive and amass more 
connections when reputational knowledge about others is avail-able, increasing in this way the density 
of the overall network. When global reputational knowledge is available, the other significant negative 
correlate of cooperativeness is Betweenness(27): individuals who connect otherwise separate parts 
of the network tend to be defectors in both theR(coefficient=−10.85;P<0.001) 
andRN(coefficient=−19.61;P<0.01) treatments, but the correlation is again insignificant in 
theNandBtreatments. The addition of global social knowledge to the baseline leads to a significant 
positive correlation (coefficient=1.21;P<0.05)between the level of clustering and cooperativeness in 
theNtreatment. This is because the probability that a subject proposes a link to another subject in 
theNtreatment is increasing in the number of neighbors they have in common 
(coefficient=0.18;P<0.001), but this relation is insignificant in any of the other treatments (seeSI 
Appendix for details). Interestingly, in theRtreat-ment, where global reputational knowledge is 
available but global social knowledge is absent, clustering is negatively associated with 
cooperativeness (coefficient=−2.08;P<0.05). In theRNtreat-ment, the two effects cancel out, and 
clustering is not correlated with cooperativeness. In summary, our analysis so far shows that the 
availability of global reputational knowledge increases the level of cooperation, payoffs, and the 
density and clustering level of the network, whereas global social knowledge does not have an effect 
on the seaggregate metrics. However, mouse movement tracking data reveal that subjects make 
active use of the network information. The information about the network is displayed using an 
interactive figure that allows subjects to highlight the neighbors of a node by mouse hovering and to 
rearrange the network layout by dragging nodes around. On average, subjects hover over 4.3(SD=1.5) 
and 4.9 (SD=1.3) nodes in each round of theRNandNtreatments, respectively. Moreover, subjects drag 
a node to rearrange the network 10.5% of the times they hover over it intheNtreatment and 11.8% of 
the times in theRNtreatment (seeSI Appendix for details). For what purpose are subjects using the 
interactive figure, and does it have any effect on outcomes? As we have seen, in theNtreatment, 
subjects use the network information in the network formation process: the probability that a subject 
proposes a link to another subject is increasing in the number of neighbors they have in common. The 
aggregate data analysis may hide the more subtle role played by global social knowledge in the 
network formation process, so we further explore its role by conducting an analysis of the 
communities that emerge in the evolution of the network. We use the well-known Louvain (28) 
algorithm to detect communities within the net-work (seeSI Appendixfor details).We rank the 
communities according to their size and focus on the largest (C1) and second largest (C2) ones after 
they have reached a stable composition. The most frequent outcome of the algorithm is the 
decomposition of the network into two com-munities, andC1 andC2 together make up, on average, 
85% of the group for all treatments.C1 has an average size of 8.0 and8.1 subjects in 
treatmentsRandRN, respectively, and an average size of 6.6 and 6.8 subjects inBandN, respectively. 
The size ofC2 is about five subjects, on average. There is no significant difference in the size ofC1orC2 
across treatments. In the statistical analysis, we aggregate the data at the session level and explore 
within-treatment differences betweenC1 andC2 by us-ing the nonparametric Mann–Whitney test (M-
W hereafter). A stability analysis reveals that the composition of the communities becomes more 
stable after round 5, which further corroborates the choice to conduct the analyses by aggregating 
the data from round 6 onward (seeSI Appendix for details).An analysis of the dynamics of link 
formation within treatment at the community level reveals that the presence of both global 
reputational and global social knowledge creates a differentiation in the behavior of subjects inC1 
compared with that of subjects inC2. Fig. 2Ashows that in theRNtreatment subjectsinC1 remove more 
connections on average than subjects inC2:the difference between the average number of 
connections re-moved by a member ofC1 and by a member ofC2 is significantinRN(M-W,P=0.018), but 
it is insignificant in any of the other treatments. The mirror image of this metric is the number of links 
that are removed by others, and the results are consistent:RNis again the only treatment in which 
there is a significant difference betweenC1 andC2 (M-W,P=0.002), and as we would expect, it is 
members of theC2 community that have more links removed than members of theC1 community (Fig. 
2B).The removal of connections by members ofC1 is only effective if the subjects who are outside (or 
have been expelled) are un-able to (re)join theC1 community. Fig. 2Cshows that this is indeed the 
case: the difference between the average number of link proposals rejected by a member ofC1 and 
those rejected by a member ofC2 is significant inRN(M-W,P=0.018), but it is insignificant in any of the 
other treatments. This shows that there are differences in the network formation process between 
members ofC1 andC2 that are only present when both global reputational and global social knowledge 
are available, but do these differences have an effect on outcomes? The addition of global social 
knowledge to global reputational knowledge has an effect on the distribution of cooperative activity 
in the group. Fig. 3Ashows the difference in the co-operation level between 
communitiesC1andC2foreachtreatment. In theRNtreatment, communityC1 has a 37% higher level of 
cooperation than communityC2 (M-W,P=0.025),whereas in all other treatments there is no significant 
difference between the level of cooperative activity inC1 andC2. In other words, the availability of 
both global reputational and social knowledge allows cooperators to form their own community by 
actively removing links from defectors and refusing to link with them again, and therefore relegating 
them to theC2 community. When either global reputational or global social knowledge is unavailable, 
this process does not occur and cooperators are evenly distributed between the two communities. 
The regression analysis at the individual level confirms thatthe presence of both global reputational 
and global social knowledge leads to an uneven distribution of cooperative activity in the group. In all 
of the regressions, we include a Community dummy that is equal to 1 if the individual belongs toC1 
and equal to 0 if the individual does not belong toC1. In theRNtreatment, there is a positive and 
significant association between the Community dummy and the level of cooperation 
(coefficient=2.02;P=0.01), whereas there is no significant association for any other treatment. In other 
words, cooperators congregate in the same community when both global reputational and social 
knowledge are available, while they are spread out across different communities otherwise. When 
both global reputational and global social knowledge are present, members ofC1 generate, on 
average, more surplus from each interaction with another member of their own com-munity 
compared with members ofC2. Fig. 3Bshows the difference between the average payoff generated by 
an interaction with a neighbor within communityC1 and by an interaction with a neighbor within 
communityC2 for each treatment, which we can interpret as a measure of how much surplus a 
community generates. In theRNtreatment, each interaction in theC1community generates, on 
average, 0.74 additional payoff points than an interaction in theC2 community (M-W,P=0.018), 
 
whereas the difference is insignificant for any of the other treatments. This effect is sizable: a member 
ofC1inRNhas, onaverage, 6.4 links with other members ofC1, so if the subject were instead a member 
ofC2, and had the same number of links withC2 members, then the potential loss in payoff would be 
4.7 points per round, or approximately 23% of the average payoff per round in RN.Discussion The 
point of departure of this study was recent experimental literature showing that the possibility for 
subjects to choose their partners by forming and breaking connections leads to thee mergence of 
cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game. In these studies, reputational knowledge was kept fixed, 
so subjects knew either only the previous actions of their neighbors (8) or the previous actions of 
everyone in the group (7, 9, 10). More-over, subjects only had access to local social knowledge, and 
thus had no information about the structure of the network with the exception of their neighbors. Our 
contributions are to show that the extent of reputational knowledge and the extent of social 
knowledge play crucial and different roles for the emergence and distribution of cooperation, as well 
as the network features associated with cooperative activity. Our first contribution is to show that the 
presence of global reputational knowledge is crucial for the emergence and sustenance of a high level 
of cooperation. This highlights that the main driver of the results in previous experiments (7, 9, 10) 
was the implicit assumption of the availability of global reputational knowledge. The treatments in 
which subjects have access to the previous five actions of everyone in the group achieve a significantly 
higher level of cooperation than the treatments in which they only have access to the neighbors’ 
previous five actions. These findings are in agreement with a recent, similar experiment (29) that 
shows that reputation fosters cooperation by varying the number of past actions available to subjects. 
The results show the crucial role of global reputational knowledge in determining the emergence of 
cooperative hubs: individuals who have a high number of connections because they are highly 
cooperative. Our second contribution is to show that the availability of global social knowledge on its 
own affects the process of net-work formation but has no effect on the overall level of co-operation, 
payoff, and aggregate network metrics. Specifically, we show that the availability of global social 
knowledge is associated with a subject’s tendency to propose connections to other subjects who are 
already connected to her neighbors, which leads to a positive correlation between the individual’s 
clustering coefficient and her cooperativeness. Previous theoretical work (18, 19) has highlighted the 
importance of social knowledge in the process of network formation, and our study shows the first 
evidence to our knowledge of its influence in the network formation process. Moreover, the role of 
social knowledge in games on networks has so far been almost completely unexplored experimentally, 
with the exception of a re-cent experiment showing that social knowledge matters in public good 
games on networks (21). The systematic experimental study of the role of social knowledge in network 
formation and in game play across different types of games is a promising area of future studies. Our 
third contribution is to show that the availability of both global reputational and global social 
knowledge has an effect on the distribution of cooperative activity in the group. The presence of both 
types of knowledge allows cooperators to remove links from defectors and reject their link proposals 
in future rounds. In this way, cooperators are able to form a community that is more cooperative than 
the community of defectors, and it generates a larger social surplus from within community inter-
actions. An open question for future research is the scalability and robustness of these findings to the 
overall size of the group. It is reasonable to imagine that the complexity of processing information 
about the network grows exponentially with the size of the network, making it more challenging to 
use it in the process of network formation. However, at the same time, the benefits from belonging 
to the cooperative community grow with the size of the community, making the establishment of a 
large cooperative community more attractive in a larger group. The finding that global reputational 
information is crucial for the emergence of a high level of cooperation is consistent with previous 
“theoretical and empirical studies of indirect reciprocity[that] stress the importance of monitoring not 
only partners in continuing interactions but also all individuals within the social network”(30) and with 
the finding that cooperation is higher inc onnected networks within which everyone is monitored (31). 
As predicted by theory (32, 33), experimental studies on indirect reciprocity with well-mixed 
populations show that reputation is important for cooperation (14, 34) and that the level of co-
operation increases with the richness of the reputation in-formation (35), as well as the 
punishment/reward technology(36) available. In this study, we find that, in the context of dynamic 
networks, cooperation almost doubles if reputation is available about everyone, rather than just one’s 
connections. The experimental result that the presence of global reputational knowledge is essential 
for the emergence of a high level of cooperation contributes to a growing and fruitful two-way 
dialogue between the theoretical and experimental literatures that study cooperation in networked 
contexts. For instance, a recent experimental contribution has shown that the structural features of a 
fixed network have an effect on the level of cooperation if the benefits from cooperation are large 
enough (37): this is in agreement with theoretical studies (38–42) and reconciles the fact that the 
theoretical predictions had not received support from previous experimental studies on fixed 
networks (24, 43–46). In an analogous fashion, our experimental results deviate from several 
theoretical studies showing that global reputational knowledge is not necessary for the emergence of 
a high level of cooperation (5, 47–52). Our experimental results suggest that some element of human 
psychology not included in the theoretical models may be the driver of the important role of global 
reputational knowledge in the experiment. Investigating the behavioral mechanism driving this 
discrepancy is a fruitful area of future research. Mechanisms that collect information about reputation 
have existed for a long time (53, 54), but the development of social networking tools (e.g., Facebook, 
LinkedIn) that augment individuals’ social knowledge is a recent phenomenon. We still have a limited 
theoretical and empirical understanding of the effects of having access to this additional social 
knowledge (19). The results of our study suggest that an effect of these tools is to facilitate the 
formation of communities whose members share behavioral commonalities. In the context of 
cooperation, we find that access to global social knowledge in addition to global reputational 
knowledge allows the emergence of a community of cooperators. Exploring whether this type of effect 
of social knowledge extends to other domains is an important direction for future inquiries. Materials 
and Methods We recruited US-based subjects on AMT, using a simple qualification task anda 
sociodemographic survey to obtain their AMT ID information. We inviteda randomly drawn subset of 
these subjects to a total of nine meta sessions that took place at 11:00 AM EST between December 12 
and 21, 2013. Each metasession comprised between two and five simultaneous experimental sessions, 
with the exact number depending on turnout. In each metasession, subjects signed in using a URL to 
our UbiquityLab web platform and participated in a session by completing the following steps: Waiting 
Room;Instructions and Interface Tour; Quiz; Game; Final Questionnaire; and Payment Confirmation. 
We paid subjects using AMT within 30 minutes after the end of each meta session. In total, 390 
subjects took part in 30 experimental sessions: we used 28 sessions (seven sessions per treatment, 
364 subjects in total) because two sessions experienced dropped out subjects after the game started 
and were excluded from our main analysis. The average earnings per subject were $5.13, including a 
$2 fixed fee for participation (55). Subjects remained completely anonymous throughout the 
qualification task and the experiment. Repeated and multiple participation were prevented by logging 
subjects’ AMT IDs and their IP addresses. See theSI Appendix for further details about the experiment. 
This research was approved by the Cambridge Experimental and Behavioral Economics Group on the 
use of human subjects, and informed consent was obtained from subjects before participation. 
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